The growing influence of a religious reform movement in Turkey

‘We have three objectives: education, education and education.’ This English slogan – one of the dozens written on the stairways of the Coskun College– illustrates that the students are not here to waste their times at school. Here discipline reigns. Coskun College is situated on the Anatolian part of Istanbul, the residential Üsküdar area, high up in the green hills of Camlica. The view on the Bosphorus metropolis is impressive, but that’s not the only thing.
This college consists of a whole complex of buildings with classrooms, a cinema, a polyvalent room, sport facilities and a swimming pool. The complex emanates quality, prestige, modernity and creativity. ‘We have got a team of 117 teachers and 1097 students. This means one teacher for ten students, while in state education institutions it’s one for 55 children. Our mission is to assist students as much as possible with their class performances and to educate them to become world citizens’, says the principle.
Coskun College is a leading education institution in Turkey: it’s ranked among the twenty best schools in the top thousand of Turkey’s quality schools. Parents register their children on a reserve list and pay a 7000 euro registration fee annually for this type of private education. ‘The state education system, although free, is no good. It failed, so people are willing to pay this kind of money’, the principle concludes. ‘And believe me: our registration fee is still rather modest.’ In accordance with the Turkish legislation this private school is secular. However, it was founded by Fethullahci, followers of the spiritual Islamic leader Fethullah Gülen, one of the most influential people in Turkey. The pedagogical project is inspired by Gülen’s principles of progress, enlightenment and development. Religion remains reserved to one’s private life. Fethullah Gülen’s portrait is nowhere to be seen. Instead, Atatürk’s statue is standing here.

Hygiene and etiquette

Over 500 Fethullah Gülen education institutions, secondary schools as well as universities, have been created world wide. More than hundred of these secondary schools are located in Turkey, with several after-school centres where potential drop-outs can prepare for a regular educational career. These are the figures that researchers and the people of the Gülen movement often refer to. But considering the growth of the Gülen community and the fact that each year new schools are being founded, the number of Gülen institutions is likely to be higher. Especially in the Kurdish region, there seems to be a remarkable and new growth.
The difference between the simplicity of the study centre for boys in the Sur District in Diyarbakir and the trophies in the exposition hall of Coskun College in the outskirts of Istanbul is striking. Sur District is a poor region in the elder part of the city, mainly inhabited by needy Kurdish families. Business men who were related to Tuskon, a young Turkish federation of 9000 industrials and Gülen-supportive businessmen, financed study centres and reading rooms for boys and girls from Diyarbarkir.
The Western modernity which characterises Istanbul’s Gülen organizations is here not yet visible. In this area the Eastern culture is predominant: shoes are taken off, tea is being drunk in tea corners with pillows on the floor. But here too, the impeccable suits are catching the eye. People who graduated from Gülen schools value hygiene and etiquette.
‘This study centre is no luxury. In the streets around, “abandoned children” are begging, stealing and sniffing petrol. We take them off the streets and try to negotiate with their parents to send their children over here’, says the centre’s coordinator. The government has promised financial support for years to this region, to this date without result. The region’s economic and social development level is half a century behind on the level of the Turkish cities in the West.

Anchored in community

Süksü Karaco is thirteen and the only child of a family with nine children who gets to study. Places are limited. Muhterrem, my host, guide and interpreter is familiar with the situation. He himself grew up in a family with nine boys. ‘I was selected when I was in Mus, looking for a student dormitory. In order to enter somewhere, one needed to pass a test, I wasn’t even able to read the questions. I was recruited anyway and accepted in a study centre. When they noticed the progress I made in one year, I got a scholarship to study in Izmir. There I graduated secondary education and afterwards university. And later I worked for the movement in Pakistan for ten years. And now I find myself here, in Diyarbakir, working for Tuskon. Maybe I’ll be elsewhere next year.’
Many of the Turkish professors working in Kazakhstan, Tanzania or Indonesia originate from poor families. Thanks to the Gülen movement, they enjoyed –free- high quality education, with the support of their “big brothers” who took them under their wings. ‘You’re not sent out in the desert once you graduate,’ says sociologist Ferhat Kentel. ‘Because you have walked the same path, you have a feeling of solidarity. Because of that feeling, you are willing to invest yourself in reproducing the same system.’ It seems like a kind of social dept one is obliged to pay off. However, leaving the movement voluntarily is possible at any time, according to local people. But the solidarity, the embeddedness that people can find here makes the social cohesion very strong.

From a psychological point of view, it’s difficult to leave that all behind, says Kentel. ‘But it’s possible. I know people who withdrew because they found their personal freedom too restricted. Sometimes, I hear less positive reasons. That one is forced to obey one’s ‘big brother’, or to pray five times a day. It’s not impossible that such things occurred, but to my knowledge nobody forces one to do these things, not even Gülen himself.’ Some people left the movement because it is too mainstream, too liberal, too boring or not religious enough.
changing Turkish society

In front of the offices of AGOS, an Armenian-Turkish newspaper, police is permanently guarding. Two years ago in broad daylight Hrant Dink was murdered on this spot, the former chief-editor of AGOS. Dink’s assassination is assumed to be linked with the Ergenekon case, a scandal which is covered intensively by the Turkish media. In this lawsuit, the secret alliances and dark sides of the “Deep State” are being exposed. In Jane’s Defence Weekly, a magazine specialized in military and security topics an article was published in which the Gülen movement was called “the third power”, due to its influential network, with branches reaching as far as national politics and the Turkish intelligence services. The article revealed some links between the Gülen movement and the Ergenekon case. ‘You can be 99% sure that the article was written by a Turkish secular author’, says Dink’s successor, Etyan Mahcupyan. ‘And then it makes sense. The problem with these secular groups in Turkey is that they are not aware of what’s driving the lower classes, high up on their hill as they are.’

According to Islam specialist Olivier Roy of the French National Centre for Scientific Research, the relationship between the Turkish state and the Fethullahci is ambiguous. Still, there is no link between the AKP (Prime Minister Erdogan’s party and the winner of last elections) and the movement, says Mahcupyan. ‘And there’s no hidden agenda either. On the contrary, the Gülen movement is using an open strategy, acting as if they were the state themselves. What is true is that they infiltrated strongly in the police-forces and in the business world. Each school they founded, each business which they established is successful.

Newcomers starting up a business immediately sign in for the conditions of their process of cooptation. In the mean time, joining Gülen is a way to enlarge your customer portfolio and make more money. Money opens doors and economical power generates more influence in the community. If one is part of a large community in an Anatolian city, one can help to govern this city and be represented in its administrative councils and chambers of commerce, which become to have sympathy for one’s ideology. Both the state and the army are suspicious that the Gülen movement would gain control over the system.’ 
This fear is also related to the transformation Turkey is undergoing nowadays, from a dogmatic secular society towards a secular society in which religion has its place, pleading for more democracy. ‘These changes are even visible within the Gülen movement. Fifteen years ago, it used to be a nationalistic and oriental-inspired movement. Now the movement aims to prepare a generation of world citizens. The movement supports the democratic reforms and became even open for discussion on the Kurdish question.’ 

criticism

In the opinion of Etyen Mahcuypan, is their system of favouritism which irritates and frightens people about this movement. ‘Nothing human is alien to them. The Gülen movement actually operates next to the existing market system. It forms a close community, trying to infiltrate in different layers of the bureaucracy. Jobs and attractive positions can only be obtained by adhering to the right kind of spiritual philosophy. If you act to ‘liberal’, you’re out.’
It’s hardly surprising that there is a deep gap between the rigid secular Turks and the Gülen movement. Also within the Alevitic community, the traditional supporters of secular parties, there is but little enthousiasm for the Sunni-Hanafitic teachings of the Gülen movement. Alevitism is a liberal Shia philosophy within the Islam. In educational issues and in Turkish mosques, there has always been a divergence between the Alevitic community and the Sunni dogmas.

‘I have big issues with the Gülen movement’, says Dogan Bermek, the spokesman of the federation of Alevitic organisations. ‘I talked to them on one of their interreligious forums. But not one single idea arose from the discussion, not even an opposite opinion. There is no point talking with them. I’m convinced that the Fethullahci are influencing the political agenda and that they have strong ties to the highest state circles, even if I can’t demonstrate this with concrete examples. Are they aiming to install a sharia state? Who knows. Nobody understands what this organisation wants exactly, as they never made any clear statement. It’s a subjective community, which could either become a liberal and modern Islam movement or a fundamentalist conservative one. I don’t know the Gülen group well enough, but what confuses me is the fact that they preach a liberal attitude and apply the Sunni dogmas at the same time. We shouldn’t be naive about this. I am definitely concerned.’
‘The question is not whether the Gülen movement has a hidden agenda. The real question is to which extent the movement is affecting the Turkish secular Muslim society.’ Murat Somer, political economist, democrat and liberal, has been analysing the Islamic media. He came to the conclusion that Zaman, a newspaper linked to the movement, applies indeed a low tolerance policy. ‘Criticising the Gülen movement itself is definitely excluded.
Using a scientifically acceptable methodology, Binnaz Toprak did research on social conservatism in the Anatolia region and concluded that there is less and less room for individualism in the Anatolian cities. She also demonstrated the increasing influence of the Gülen movement in the rural areas. Zaman ridiculised her research and declared it unscientific.’ Somer can relate to the values of the Gülen group, but has some concerns. ‘How pluralistic is their democracy story in Anatolia? How do they recruit their new members? What about gender equality and the respect for the individual’s freedom of choice? Does one still has the right to gain own experiences within the group? What about homosexuality, creationism and Darwinism? Where does social pressure end, if even there is pressure to take decisions like not drinking raki? When you see a municipality poster with the slogan ‘alcoholism is the mother of all evil’, you have the right to be sceptical. Why is alcohol bad? Is it a matter of health or a matter of religious conviction?’

Box 1
Guru of the modern Islam?

Fethullah Gülen was born in 1942 in Erzurum. He is a former imam from Edirne and Izmir. Gülen was inspired by Said Nursi and continued his teachings with his own interpretations. In the mean time, he has been living in the Unites States for ten years. Fethullahci refer to his medical condition (diabetes) to explain this absence in Turkey, but it seems more likely that the charismatic religious leader took off because he was no longer safe on Turkish soil. Already in the seventies, Gülen was prosecuted by the Turkish security services for being involved in clandestine religious activities, such as organizing youth summer camps. Later on, he was brought to justice by the Turkish state on several occasions for having violated against the precarious dark red principles of Turkish secularism. In the West, some progressive intellectuals see him as an ally for reforms and tolerance, much to the irritation of his local opponents. 

The Gülen movement itself is difficult to define and its subcultures vary according to their national context and social environment. Considered by some as a homogenous cult, (origineel: “door sommigen als een cultus van gelijke soorten omschreven” ??) others think the movement is very mainstream. ‘The word “movement” is in fact a paradox’, a Gülen adept tells. ‘It implies that we would be the movement of Fethullah Gülen himself, who would be pulling the strings behind the curtain and created a whole structure. But there is no structure, merely a global network of people subscribing to the same spiritual values.’ Academics who are familiar with the movement describe the Gülen community as very diverse, as a group of individuals with a specific interpretation of religiousness. 

In Turkey, the number of Gülen movement supporters is estimated to be around five million. However, as there is no such thing as a movement ‘membership card’ and because of the lack of clarity which seems to characterise the movement, this number is probably underestimated.
The group of Fethullah-inspired souls is being considered a network with an important influence, which causes quite some controversy (mainly in secular Turkey). Kemalists, whose power is reducing, consider the Islamic movement as a serious threat to the secular state. The Gülen movement is apolitical, yet has strong links to some of the state functionaries. Its influence on the economy is also important. ‘The Gülen movement is a money generating network, influencing the whole society’, says Turkish columnist Etyen Mahcupyan. ‘It’s a secular movement which made religion the basis for their ethics and culture and at the same time doesn’t reject modernism. Striking in this sense is the fact that Fethullahci are keen on taking over Western living habits. They love the gadgets of the modern life.’

Researchers also report about a ‘social roots’ movement. Sociologist Ferhat Kentel: ‘The Gülen movement succeeded to use a kind of resistance language which is also applied by the state. (Origineel: “…die ook de staat betrekt.”; “is being applied by the state” of “can also be applied to/against the state”??) It’s a kind of resistance to power, without conflicting directly with the state.’

Box 2
Gülen organisations

Education remains its flagship, but in the past ten years the Gülen movement has expanded its activities to other areas. Under the wings of the Journalists and Writers’ Foundation (GYV), founded in 1994 by Gülen-inspired writers and journalists, several umbrella organisations arose, with branches in the media and in the social sector. The same GYV produces many books, videos and audio tapes with recorded speeches of Fethullah Gülen and edits Gülen-oriented magazines. The Foundation has been created in order to reduce the tension between secular, nationalist and religious groups in Turkey, according to director Mustafa Yesil. ‘There were increasing tensions between left and right, Alevits and Sunni, secular and religious groups. The Almighty himself created these differences, forming one coherent mosaic. Within this mosaic, there shall be no opposition. This is what Fethullah Gülen says, and that is why we try to reunite people.’

The GYV is the umbrella organisation of Abant Platform, the Intercultural Dialogue Centre, the Eurasia Platform, media groups such as the Zaman newspaper, an own TV-station (Samanloyu-tv) and the humanitarian aid organisation Kimse Yokmu. The latter one was created after the 1999 earth quake in the Marmara-region. In the mean time, Kimse Yokmu has branch offices in 81 Turkish provinces and is operating across the borders: Darfur, Bangladesh, Birma, Peru… One of the organisation’s core activities are the ‘foster’ family projects: rich families engaging themselves to take custody over poorer ones. Next to the logistical support, moral support is being offered. ‘When you are doing better than someone else, you have to share that happiness. This is my conviction, based on my religion. By making this world a better place, I invest in my own future as well’, says a wealthy man from Diyarbakir, who is taking care of a widow and her child since two years. (td)

Box 3
Abant

British researcher Berna Turam calls the Gülen group a sociological midfield organisation, embedded in a Turkish context and influencing the social debate through a number of dialogue initiatives. Among these initiatives, the Abant Platform is the most public one. Abant has been founded ten years ago as an organisation aiming to enhance the dialogue between cultures, identities and ethnical groups. ‘We started off to fulfil a social need: the need to bridge the gap between secular and religious groups in order to open sensitive subjects for discussion’, says Salih Yaylaci, the secretary-general of Abant. Abant’s pluralistic steering committee organises monthly meetings during which the Turkish society is being debated, both in its national and international context. Subjects vary according to the recent events dominating the public debate at the moment of the meeting. ‘We are a neutral forum, but we do stand for democratic values, for the individual’s rights and liberties, for Europe and for peace. And we are not in support for military interventions.’

Abant subscribes to Gülen’s apolitical attitude and because of this, it managed to play a role in a number of changes in the Turkish society, Yaylaci thinks. ‘It’s impossible to measure the level of influence, but we were the first to open the debate on the Kurdish question. Only after Abant organised a conference in North Iraq, the Turkish president and prime minister travelled there.’

Abant created also openings towards the Jewish and Greek-orthodox communities. ‘The different communities used to live very separately’, says head rabbi ?zak Haleva, the spokesman of the Jewish community in Istanbul. ‘Now our relationship goes even beyond the formal level, there are some personal contacts. We don’t have taboo subjects. But as we are religious people, we don’t discuss politics.’

Sociologist Ferhat Kentel of the Bilgi University is also a member of the Abant Platform steering committee. With a self made cigarette in his hand, his bewildered hairstyle and his casual dress code, he doesn’t live up to the image one would have of a representative of the Abant Forum. ‘Through their exchanges with liberals like me and Ahmat Altan of Taraf, who don’t have any prejudices towards them, the movement gains its legitimacy. And it works in both ways: for me it’s important too to get to know these people. I appreciate them for the bridge they try to build between two separate worlds in Turkey: religion and laicism.’ However, Kentel says he could never be part of the Gülen movement. ‘I can not identify myself with them. I am a democrat, a left wing liberal. I have outspoken opinions on political and social issues. This would never match with the principles of the Gülen movement.’ (td)